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JURISDICTION AND LIMITED APPEARANCE IN NEW
YORK: DILEMMA OF THE NONRESIDENT
DEFENDANT
LOUIS R. FRUMERt

A NONRESIDENT 1 of New York, is served in his home state
with summons and complaint in a divorce action instituted in New
York. The complaint charges that X has committed certain acts of adultery, and demands judgment for alimony and counsel fees. X doesn't believe that these charges of adultery can be substantiated, and he certainly
doesn't want any judgment against him for alimony and counsel fees.
He consults his local attorney, Smith, who consults by telephone a New
York lawyer, Brown, for advice on the New York law of appearance.
Smith explains the situation to Brown, and then continues:
"I, of course, recall the hornbook principles of jurisdiction. Maintenance,
of an action against a nonresident is often difficult because of the limitations
of territorial jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that a court which lacks jurisdiction
over the person of a defendant is unable to render a personal judgment against
him. Ordinarily, personal service must be made upon a nonresident within the
state of suit for a court of that state to acquire in personam jurisdiction. Only
in limited situations, exemplified by the nonresident motorist and the nonresident
individual doing business within the state, 2 has there been deviation from this
requirement of personal service within the state as the basis for acquisition of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. But some form of service other than
personal service within the state, may be sufficient to bestow upon a court in
rem3 jurisdiction to act as to a specific subject-matter or status considered to be
X

1 Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.
1. The term "nonresident", as used in this article, includes both a natural person who
is a non-domiciliary of the state and a foreign corporation whose contacts with a state
are not sufficient to subject it to the in personam jurisdiction of the courts of that state.
That domicile within the state may be sufficient to lift the bar of territorial jurisdiction
as to a natural person, see Mlliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) ; N.Y. Civ. PnAC. Acr
§ 235, amended N. Y. Laws 1946, c. 144 on recommendation of New York Judicial Council,
ELEvENTn A.xUAL REPORT or THE NEW YORE JUDICIAL Couxcu 193 (194S); N. Y. Laws
1949, c. 185 on recommendation of New York Judicial Council, Fnwrr kzwuA. REPoR
or THE NEW YORK JunciIAL CouNcil, (1949).

2. Even the constitutionality of statutes such as N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 229-b, relating
to service of summons on a nonresident natural person doing business within the state, has
yet to be sustained by the United States Supreme Court; see Interchemical Corp. v. Mirabelli, 269 App. Div. 224, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 522 (1st Dep't 1945); REPORT or nE NEw Yoni
LAW RVIox Coa mIsslON 105-155 (1940).
3. The term "in remn", as used in this article, includes any type of proceeding in which
in personam jurisdiction is not required in order that a court might act. The distinction
is drawn between actions strictly in rem, which affect the interests of all persons in a thing;
actions quasi in rem, which affect only the interests of particular persons; and actions relating to status. See, in general, Fraser, Actions in Rem, 34 Cor. L. Q. 29 (1948).
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*within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Of course, a demand for a money
judgment, which requires in personam jurisdiction, may be coupled with a claim
involving a specific subject-matter or status, for which in rem jurisdiction will
be sufficient. For example, in rem jurisdiction is sufficient for foreclosure of a
lien upon property within the state, whereas in personam jurisdiction is required
for rendition of a deficiency judgment after sale of the property subject to the
lien. Or, an in personam claim for money, originally involving no specific
subject-matter, may be converted into an in rem proceeding by attachment of a
nonresident's property within the state, to the extent of the value of the property.
I know that this divorce action, insofar as the decree of divorce itself is concerned, is in that category."
"Yes, that's all very sound," interrupts Brown. "Now, you can ignore this
action and the New York court will not have any power to render a judgment
against X for alimony and counsel fees, for the mere presence of a demand for
in personam relief is ineffective in the absence of in personam jurisdiction. The
remedy of sequestration is available in New York in divorce actions; in principle
it is similar to attachment, but it is not available if the defendant owns no property in this state. Or, you can make a general appearance to contest the divorce
on the merits, but then the court will acquire in personam jurisdiction to render
a judgment against X for alimony and counsel fees. There is no occasion
for a special appearance here, for its purpose is solely to contest the jurisdiction
of the court."
"We do not want to make a general appearance," replies Smith. "What we
want to do is appear and contest this divorce on the merits, without submitting
to the in personam jurisdiction of the court as to alimony and counsel fees."
"I have never heard of that being done," says Brown, who by now is beginning to feel that Smith will be a rather difficult associate, "but we'll check the
New York law just to be certain that it can't be done."
"By the way, I don't suppose this affects X's case," says Smith, as he is about
to hang up, "but you'll probably should know that X's wife contends that he
fraudulently secured around $20,000 from her for an investment which didn't
turn out very well. She hasn't said anything about this money in her complaint,
and so I imagine that she's decided to forget about it."
"That does complicate matters," Brown explains. "New York procedure
permits an entirely new cause of action to be added by amendment in an action
already pending. If we make a general appearance in this divorce action, X's
wife might amend her complaint, as of course or by leave of court, and add
this claim for $20,000. The amended complaint could then be served upon me
as X's New York Attorney."
"Your procedure doesn't seem to be very fair to a nonresident," replies
Smith. "I think it raises some constitutional questions of due process. Certainly
it doesn't give a nonresident very much choice as to what he should do. Would
you let me have a memorandum on the entire problem?"
The foregoing conversation raises a perplexing and difficult problem,
whether, if an action is originally based upon proper acquisition of in
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rem jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant may enter a limited appearance
in New York for the sole purpose of contesting the in rem claim on the
merits, without thereby subjecting himself to the in personam jurisdiction
of the court either as to claims for personal relief presented in the original
complaint or claims added by an amended or supplemental complaint.
I.

DEMAND FOR IN PERSONAM: RELIEF IN THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

The problems of special appearance and limited appearance have been
intertwined in the decisions, but the distinction between the two must
be kept clear. A nonresident defendant may desire merely to contest the
jurisdiction of the court, to prevent entry of an in personam judgment
against him, and the procedural device ordinarily available to him for
this purpose is the special appearance. But whereas the traditional
special appearance is solely to contest the jurisdiction of the court, a
limited appearance is an appearance solely to contest on the merits the
portion of the action based upon acquisition of in rem jurisdiction. However, a limited appearance will ordinarily include a special appearance,
insofar as an adjudication may be required that the court does not possess
in personam jurisdiction. The right to make a special appearance therefore must affect the right to make a limited appearance, for it is inconceivable that the right to make a limited appearance but not a special
appearance should exist in a particular situation. Initially, for that
reason, attention must be directed to the special appearance cases involving joinder of in personam and in rem claims.
If only in personam relief has been demanded, but the mode of service
employed is not sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction upon the
court, the defendant may appear specially and move to set aside service
of summons. If, however, in rem relief has also been demanded, and the
service is sufficient to justify the exercise of in rem jurisdiction, may the
defendant still appear specially and move to set aside the service of
summons? In Jackson v. Jackson,4 plaintiff sought a separation and also
invalidation of a separation agreement. Defendant moved to set aside
service of summons outside of the state upon the theory that so much
of the complaint as was directed toward setting aside of the separation
agreement ran in personam, and that plaintiff was seeking in personam
relief as a preliminary step toward relief in rem in the form of a judgment of separation. The Supreme Court at Special Term agreed with
the defendant that the separation could not be granted if the separation
agreement remained unimpeached. But, it concluded, in effect only one
cause of action need have been alleged and, under such circumstances,
defendant's motion should not be granted. The Appellate Division, after
4.

290 N. Y. 512, 49 N. E. 2d 988 (1943).
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affirmance without opinion, certified to the Court of Appeals the question
whether the action was one where the court might obtain jurisdiction
over a nonresident by constructive service. The Court of Appeals also
affirmed denial of defendant's motion, viewing the complaint as alleging
two causes of action, separable and separated. The demand for invalidation of the separation agreement was held not to affect the court's in
rein jurisdiction over the separation cause, since the prayer for in personama relief was merely a demand for additional relief which the court
could not give under the circumstances.'
There can be no quarrel with the Court of Appeals in the Jackson case,
if it merely intended to hold that a defendant may not move to set aside
entirely the service of a summons if the complaint demands in rem relief
for which the service is sufficient. But, did the court also intend to hold
that this defendant could not have a ruling on jurisdiction prior to any
participation in the action on the merits? The New York Rules of Civil
Practice make provision for a "motion for judgment dismissing the complaint, or one or more causes of action stated therein," upon the ground
that "the court has not jurisdiction of the person of the defendant."'
The defendant in the Jackson case did not specifically move for dismissal
of the in personam claim for invalidation of the separation agreement,
and the lower court had not ordered dismissal of the in personam claim,
for it originally held that in substance only one cause of action was stated.
Furthermore, it has been held that a motion to dismiss under these rules
should not be granted as to a specific cause of action, if the motion is
directed generally against the entire complaint.7 A motion to set aside
service of a summons, after the complaint has been served, actually
operates as a motion for dismissal of the complaint, but the fact that
service of the summons will not be set aside should not preclude a defen5. Id. at 516, 49 N. E. 2d at 990: "Ordinarily it is enough, as against a motion to set
acide service by publication or personally outside the state, that there be found in the complaint allegations which, if proven, would entitle plaintiff to a judgment in ren. Other
allegations of personal liability may, at this point in the litigation, be disregarded, likewise
such parts of the prayer for judgment as demand a judgment in personam."
6. Rule 106 (1), as to defect appearing upon the face of the complaint; Rule 107 (1),
same provision for motion on the complaint and an affidavit stating' facts tending to
show that the court has not jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. Obviously this type
of defect would not ordinarily appear upon the face of the complaint.
7. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 271 App. Div. 1016, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 394 (2d Dep't 1947). Defendant moved to dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, a complaint alleging an in rem cause for
separation-and an in personam cause for an injunction. Order denying motion to dismiss
affirmed upon the ground that there was jurisdiction with respect to the in rem cause, and
the motion was not specifically directed to the in rem cause. This holding was based upon
the cases applying this rule to a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action. It is highly questionable that this rule should be applied in a situation involving
jurisdiction.
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dant from appearing specially and moving specifically for dismissal of
the in personam cause. In Engel v. Engel)' an in rem claim for an
interest in trust property located in New York was joined with in personam demands for an accounting and specific performance of an agreement to pay income. The court in the Engel case granted defendant's
motion to set aside service of the summons, to the extent of dismissing
the action insofar as it sought a decree for accounting and specific performance. Whether or not under the Jackson case such an order partially
setting aside the service of summons is improper, cannot the same relief,
insofar as a special appearance is concerned, be obtained by a proper
motion under Rule 107?
Difficulty arises from reliance solely upon Rule 107 because of the
limitations probably imposed by use in both Rules 106 and 107 of the
term "cause of action". These words of art have not been construed for
purposes of these specific rules, and the varying interpretations given
to them for both the same and different purposes are now legendary
0
In Brainardv. Brainard,"
an action for divorce, alimony, custody, and
counsel fees was commenced by service outside of the state. Defendant,
with an eye on the Jackson case, filed a special appearance in conjunction
with an answer, which merely set forth that defendant was a nonresident
of the state and that the court was therefore without in personam jurisdiction. There is no indication that defendant was interested in contesting
the divorce action on the merits, but, if defendant were a resident of
New York, the constructive service might have been sufficient to give
the court in personam jurisdiction. Under the 1946 amendment to Section
235 of the Civil Practice Act, in personam jurisdiction may be acquired
by service outside of the state in an action for money only against a
resident. This amendment has been construed to confer in personam
jurisdiction as to alimony and counsel fees in a divorce action against a
resident, although such an action is not for a sum of money only."
8. 22 N. Y. S. 2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
9. Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N. Y. 287, 298, 200 N. E. 824, 826

(1936)

(problem of applicability of different statutes of limitations to each of several

grounds of recovery for the same injury): "Since the defendant has committed but a single
wrong and the plaintiff has suffered but a single injury, the plaintiff has in one sense only
a single cause of action. . . . However, 'a "cause of action" may mean one thing for one
purpose and something different for another. (United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co.,
288 U. S.62, 67, 68.) Judicial decision cannot be based soundly upon dialectical distinctions
or rigid application of purely formal concepts." See, in general, Cr.AxY, CODE-PL
r;m 127
et seq. (2d ed. 1947) and authorities collected therein; Cleary, Res Judicafa Reexamined, 57
Y=LE L. 3. 339 (1948).
10. 272 App. Div. 575, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 1 (1st Dep't 1947), a'd mem., 297 N. Y. 916,
79 N. E. 2d 744 (1948).
11. Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 189 Misc. 776, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1947), 23
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Plaintiff then moved for alimony pendente lite, custody, and counsel fees,
contending that this answer was equivalent to a general appearance in
the case, thereby conferring in personam jurisdiction upon the court.
Defendant contended that under the Jackson case he could not move to
set aside service of summons, that the in personam demand for alimony,
custody, and counsel fees did not constitute a separate cause of action
for purposes of Rule 107,12 and therefore the court's lack of in personam
jurisdiction could only be set up by answer. The majority opinion in the
Appellate Division, without any attention to defendant's real or fancied
dilemma, held that inasmuch as defendant had filed an answer, he had
made a general appearance under Section 237 of the Civil Practice Act.'
The majority relies for this interpretation of Section 237 on McClure
N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 340 (1948) (personal service without the state) ; Dirksen v. Dirksen,
72 N.Y. S. 2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1947), 48 COL. L. REv. 287 (1948) (service by publication).
Under the 1949 amendment to N. Y. Civ. PIAc. ACT § 235, effective September 1, 1949,
" . . . a defendant domiciled in the state, may be served with the summons without an
order, without the state in the same manner as if such service were made within the
state. . . " The amendment makes "it clear that domicile rather than the ambiguous term
'residence,' is the test, and broadens the right to serve defendants without the state to any
case in which such defendant is a domiciliary." BULLETIN OF THE AssociATIoN OF TIHE BAR
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 321 (1949).

12. Galusha v. Galusha, 138 N. Y. 272, 281, 33 N. E. 1062, 1063 (1893): "The demand
for alimony in a divorce suit is not an essential part of the cause of action. As described by
Bishop it is merely an 'appendage' of the action. . . . Or where it enters into the final
decree it is, as defined by this court, in the Forrest case (25 N. Y. 501), 'a mere incident
of the judgment.'"
It must be noted that in the Ellsworth case, defendant's motion to set aside service
of the summons and complaint was made in opposition to a motion by plaintiff for temporary alimony and counsel fees. A tenuous distinction can be drawn on that basis, that
plaintiff's motion dependent in its entirety upon acquisition of in personam jurisdiction.
See also, Patnode v. Patnode, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Feldman v. Feldman,
189 Misc. 564, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; in neither of these cases was any question raised of defendant's right to appear specially to contest a motion for temporary
alimony and counsel fees.
In the Ellsworth case ibid., the defendant appeared specially and moved to set aside
service of summons on the ground that he was not a resident of the state. The court denied
the motion on finding that defendant was a resident of New York. But, in the light of
the Jackson case, did the court properly take the motion under consideration? See also,
Carnegie v. Carnegie, 274 App. Div. 887, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 252 (1st Dep't 1948), wherein
defendant was allowed, without discussion of propriety, to contest jurisdiction to award
alimony by special appearance. Consider also, N. Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT § 235, amended, N. Y.
Laws 1946, c. 144, N. Y. Laws 1949, c. 185.
13. "The defendant's appearance must be made by serving upon the plaintiff's attorney,
within twenty days after service of the summons exclusive of the day of service, a notice
of appearance, a copy of an answer or a notice of motion raising an objection to the complaint in point of law. A voluntary general appearance of the defendant is equivalent to
personal service of the summons upon him."
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Newspaper Syndicate v. Times Publishing Co.,' 4 a case presenting a
clearly distinguishable situation. The issue in the McClure case was
whether or not a proper person had been served as representative of a
domestic corporation; the defendant had moved to set aside service of
summons, but then served an answer, merely setting up the issue of the
court's jurisdiction, prior to determination of the motion. Probably the
defendant in the McClure case served this answer to eliminate the possibility of a default judgment being taken against it pending determination
of its motion; it could, of course, have eliminated this possibility by
securing an extension of time to plead. 15 But, there was no problem in
the McClure case of joinder of in rem and in personam claims, and
service there was either proper or defective as to the entire action. The
court did hold that service of the answer was equivalent to a general
appearance, but even assuming the case on its facts to be sound, its
reasoning should not be decisive in the situation presented by the
Brainard case. In the McClure case, the issue of proper service could
without question have been tested by the motion to set aside service of
summons. The dissent in the Brainardcase by Justice Van Voorhis, with
Justice Shientag concurring, after pointing out the dual nature of an
action for divorce by a wife who is also applying for alimony, concurs
in defendant's argument that, under the Jackson case, he could not have
moved to set aside the service of summons. The dissent impliedly recognizes the validity of defendant's argument that a motion could not be
made under Rule 107 to dismiss the claims for in personam relief, by its
approval of the answer method by which the defendant did attempt to
contest jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in Zeide v. Flexser,'0 the complaint alleged two
causes of actibn sounding in personam, the first for the reasonable value
of services and for disbursements and the second for money loaned. A
third cause repeated by reference the allegations of the first two causes
and sought to set aside a conveyance of property within New York alleged
to be in fraud of creditors. Defendant's motion to set aside service of
summons outside of the state was denied, but note the manner in which
the court's order was phrased:
"Accordingly, the motion is in all respects denied with leave to serve an
answer within fifteen days after service of a copy of the order to be entered
hereon, with notice of entry, reserving, however, the Hght to object to the juris14.
15.
Dep't
16.

164 App. Div. 108, 149 N. Y. Supp. 443 (1st Dep't 1914).
Zabriskie v. Second National Bank, 204 App. Div. 428, 198 N. Y. Supp. 482 (1st
1923).
175 Misc. 911, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 610 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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diction in respect to the relief prayed for under the first and second causes of
action."17
The court in the Zeide case, in denying defendant's motion to set aside
service of summons, allowed the defendant to make a limited appearance!
The fraudulent conveyance cause necessarily was based upon the in
personam claims of the plaintiff, representing a method of enforcement
of the plaintiff's claims. Would the fraudulent conveyance cause constitute a separate "cause of action" under Rule 107?
In Paprin v. Bitker, 8 an action was brought for specific performance
of a contract for sale of realty in New York. The complaint contained
an alternate prayer for damages. Relying upon the Jackson case, the
court granted plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's special appearance,
but, note, once again, the form of the court's order:
"It follows that this court has jurisdiction of the defendant in so far as
plaintiff seeks judgment for specific performance and plaintiff's motion to strike
the special appearance is granted, but with leave to the defendant, within ten
days after service of entry, to serve an answer, reserving, however, his right to
object to the jurisdictionof this court in respect to any judgment in personam."'0
Unless the alternative prayer for damages be regarded as a separate
cause of action for the purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 107,20
the defendant here was in the same position as the defendant in the
Brainardcase. Yet the court in the Paprincase, just as in the Zeide case,
clearly allowed the defendant to make a limited appearance, to serve an
answer contesting the specific performance action on the merits without
subjecting himself to the in personam jurisdiction of the court as to the
alternate prayer for damages.
The Jackson and Brainard cases create uncertainty as to whether or
not there is even any right of special appearance solely for the purpose
of contesting jurisdiction in situations not within Rules 106 and 107,
and the need for legislation in this respect has been suggested.2 If there
17.

Id. at 913, 25 N. Y. S. 2d at 612 (italics supplied).

18.

64 N. Y. S. 2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1946).

19.

Id.

at 291

(italics supplied).

20. See Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 (1901) ; CL.ARx, supra note 9, 444, 475.
21. Saxe, 1947-1948 Survey of N. Y. Law-Civil Remedies, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 867,
874 (1948). For apparently contrary position, see Comment, Special Appearance in New
York, 34 CoRN. L. Q. 230, 238 (1948), wherein the view is expressed that "although the

limited application of Rule 107 may exist through inadvertence, there is much to be said
for the final result." Nothing at all is then said to justify the final result, other than an expression of enthusiasm for denial of the right to make a special appearance to a "defendant
who admits adulterous conduct but who seeks to escape the moral obligation to support
his wife and children."
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be no right of special appearance in situations not within Rules 106 or
107 because the in personam claim does not constitute a separate "cause
of action", it is difficult to find a right of limited appearance in such
situations. Yet, the Zeide and Paprin cases appear to grant the right of
limited appearance. Of course, even if the right of special appearance
does exist in a particular situation, it cannot be assumed that the right
of limited appearance also there exists. Suppose, however, that a plaintiff
joins two separate and independent claims, one sounding in personam
and the other in rem, and there is no doubt that the in personam cause
is subject to a motion to dismiss under Rule 107. Defendant appears
specially, files a proper motion to dismiss, and at the same time files an
answer on the merits as to the in rem cause. Joinder of the answer with
the motion to dismiss probably would bring the defendant within the
rule of numerous cases, not actually involving this particular type of
situation, that acts of a defendant inconsistent with a special appearance
solely to contest jurisdiction will constitute a general appearance.? Yet
conceivably, within the framework of existing cases and statutes, a
defendant might appear specially, move to dismiss the in personam cause
under Rule 107, and at the same time secure an extension of time to
plead. Then, if the motion be granted, and the in personam cause
dismissed, appear and defend the in rem action on the merits.
Similar problems arise in actions in which jurisdiction is based upon
attachment of a nonresident's property. P, a resident of New York, has
a claim for $5,000 against X, a resident of New Jersey. X cannot be
served in New York, but he does own property worth $1,000, subject
to attachment in New York. P can attach the property, serve X either
by publication or personally without the state, and the New York court
thereby acquires in rem jurisdiction to the extent of the value of the
property. A subsequent suit by P for the balance due, after sale of the
attached property, will be based upon his original cause of action and
not upon the first judgment. X, once again, may make a general appearance and litigate the entire claim upon the merits. This situation is quite
similar to that in the Zeide case, and there can be little doubt that it is
not a situation within Rules 106 or 107. Unless there be some defect in
the constructive service or attachment proceedings, there would be no
reason for X to attempt to make a special appearance except, in a proper
case, for a determination as to domicile. But, may X enter a limited
appearance for the purpose of contesting the merits of P's claim to the
extent of the value of the property? Although different policy considerations might be applicable in this attachment situation than in a divorcealimony, lien foreclosure-deficiency judgment, or specific performance22. 2 CARmuwOY's NEw YoRx PRncTIC 1362-1363 (2d ed. 1930) (Supp. 1948).
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damages situation, the purpose and function of the limited appearance
remains the same.'
Although the American Law Institute Restatement of Judgments does
24
not appear clearly to take a stand in situations not involving attachment,
it does take the position in the attachment situation that X may enter
a limited appearance:
"§ 40. If, in a proceeding begun by attachment or garnishment or by a
23.

An analogy may perhaps be drawn to the situation in which the nonresident de-

fendant contends that an attachment should be vacated because he is not the owner of the
attached property. Ordinarily, a defendant may make a special appearance to contest the
validity of the attachment, the basis for the exercise of in rem jurisdiction. Zabriskie v
Second National Bank, 204 App. Div. 428, 198 N. Y. Supp. 482 (1st Dep't 1923) (property
attached which belonged to defendant but which was not subject to attachment); Manice
v. Gould, 1 Abb. Pr. (N.S.) 255 (N. Y. 1866). Defendant cannot, however, by motion on
special appearance, assert the title of third persons to the attached property as a basis for
vacating the attachment. The defendant may contest ownership of the property in his
answer, or the claimant to the property may proceed under N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 924, as
amended N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 351, N. Y. Laws 1940, c. 625, N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 253.
Godbout v. Irwin, 273 App. Div. 1029, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 461 (2d Dep't 1948), motion for leave
to appeal dismissed, 298 N. Y. 636, 82 N. E. 2d 31 (1948) ; David S. Stern Corp. v. Silverman, 257 App. Div. 394, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 355 (lst Dep't 1939). See Untermeyer, J., dissenting,
257 App. Div. at 395, 13 N. Y. S. 2d at 356: "The reversal of the order [of dismissal],
though with leave to interpose an answer contesting the ownership of the property attached,
deprives the defendants of the opportunity to test the question of ownership, and hence of
jurisdiction, before they are subjected to the inconvenience and expense of appearing
generally in the action to defend upon the merits.
"Section 924 . . . would only apply a claim of ownership of the property attached by
a third party not involved in this proceeding." In Dalinda v. Abegg, 177 Misc. 265, 29
N. Y. S. 2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1941), the court suggested that ordinarily a reference could be
ordered to determine ownership of the property attached, but it then denied defendant's
motion on the ground that plaintiff would require defendant's testimony on the issue of
ownership of the property and plaintiff could not get such testimony on a reference because it related to a matter separate and apart from a trial. "If the cases so limiting the right
of examination before trial (Norton v. Cromwell, 248 App. Div. 707, 290 N. Y. Supp. 107
(1st Dep't 1936); Matter of Erlanger, 231 App. Div. 70, 246 N. Y. Supp. 275 (1st Dep't
1930). Contra: Loonsk Bros., Inc. v. Mednick, 246 App. Div. 464, 285 N. Y. Supp. 801
(4th Dep't 1935); Etter v. Early Foundry Co., 164 Misc. 88, 298 N. Y. Supp. 208 (Sup. Ct.
1937)), be sound and applicable to this particular situation, defendant's rights could be
protected by allowing him to make a limited appearance as to the property attached, after
raising the issue of ownership in his answer.
24. RESTATEMENT, JUixMETS § 19, Comment b (1942): "What constitutes a general
appearance. If the defendant enters an appearance in a proceeding in personam without
limiting the purposes for which he appears, the appearance is a general appearance. If the
court did not already have jurisdiction over him, such an appearance confers jurisdiction
over him. If the defendant interposes an answer or demurrer or makes a motion raising a
question as to the merits of the plaintiff's claim, this is a general appearance, even though
the defendant shows that he does not intend thereby to submit himself to the jurisdiction
.
of the court. ....
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creditor's bill in a court which has no jurisdiction over the defendant, he enters
an appearance for the purpose of contesting the validity of the plaintiff's claim,
he does not thereby subject himself to the jurisdiction of the court, if in appearing he states that he does not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court."
The proceedings in the American Law Institute show that this section

was adopted in the belief that it represented an accurate statement of
existing law.' The two cases to which Professor Scott referred, during
discussion of this problem before the American Law Institute, as squarely

holding that a nonresident may enter a limited appearance in the attach25. 19 PROCFinGS, THE Amz=As
LAW INsnTITU291-301 (1941-42):
"Mr. Scott: When the defendant puts in a general appearance, that will give the court
jurisdiction over him personally so it can give a personal judgment against him, the result
being that although the proceeding started is one quasi in rem it has been turned into one
in personam. On the other hand, if the defendant appears solely to attack the validity
of the attachment or garnishment or creditor's bill and does not urge any defense on the
merits, then that does not give the court jurisdiction over him personally. There are one
or two cases the other way. Finally, comes the case where he wants to protect his
property by a defense on the merits, but does not want to submit himself personally to
the jurisdiction. Can he do so? Can he defend on the merits without submitting himself
personally? Of course, if no property has been attached, and he puts in a plea on the
merits, the court gets jurisdiction over him. But where his property has been attached
must he either kiss it goodbye or submit himself generally to the jurisdiction? If he
wants to defend, should he not have a third alternative, that is to permit him to put in
a plea on the merits but at the same time stipulating he shall not personally be subject
to the jurisdiction? I have been able to find only three cases squarely on the point. Two
of them are this way. I have cited them in Illustration 1; and the other is a recent case
in Rhode Island (Industrial Trust Co. v. Rabinowitz, 13 A. (2d) 2S9, 129 A.L.R. 1236
(1940)), which held the other way, where the defendant was a resident of the State and
the court expressly said these cases where the defendant was a non-resident were different.
I have said here that where the defendant is a non-resident, which is what we are dealing
with here, he can defend the property on the merits without submitting himself personally.
The Advisers were all this way. The Council was divided. A majority favored the rule
as we have here stated it. The authorities, such as there are, are this way.
"Judge Donworth: When I read this I was surprised to learn that this is the law. I
never would have advised a client living outside the State of Washington that if his
property in the State was attached that he could confess that attachment and be immune
from the rendition of a judgment. I accept, of course, the statement of the Reporter that
that is the law. I think it will surprise many members of the profession.
"Air. Sims: I was one member of the Council who disagreed with this blackletter and
devoted all the time that was necessary to read all the authorities on it which the Reporter
has mentioned. I did not read the Rhode Ieland case. There was no authority but these,
at least so far as I could find, and I proceeded to reason it out, and it seems to me that
the Reporter is completely justified in stating the law as it is in the absence of decisions
to the contrary.
"Mr. Scott: There is an English case the other way where the defendant counterclaimed
and, of course, that was easy. See The Duplel:x [1912] P. 8."
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ment situation are Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes0 and Salmon Falls
Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co." An early New York case,
Swift v. Tross,2" appears to have been overlooked. In the Swift case,
the court rather summarily rejected the right of limited appearance after
attachment of the nonresidents' property, on the ground that defendants
could not "obtain all the advantages of contesting their entire indebtedness which would follow from a general appearance, and yet avoid the
disadvantages of contesting their entire indebtedness which would follow
from a general appearance, and yet avoid the disadvantages resulting
from such appearance."29 This reasoning is fallacious in its assumption
that defendant by making a limited appearance would be able to secure
all the advantages which would follow from a general appearance. This
is not at all true, for, as pointed out by the court in the Cheshire National
Bank case:
"The bar of whatever judgment may be rendered, where a non-resident
defendant appears specially merely for the purpose of protecting his interest
in attached property, extends no further against the plaintiff than it does against
the defendant. It relates only to the property of the defendant held under
effectual attachment."3 0
No other New York cases have been found specifically dealing with
the attachment situation, but, in Grant v. Kellogg Co., 1 a federal district
court expressed the opinion that such a limited appearance cannot be
made under New York procedure. An action for money damages for
breach of contract was instituted in a New York state court by attaching
bank deposits of the defendant foreign corporation in New York and
personally serving the defendant outside of the state. After removal of
the action to the federal court, defendant moved for an order "permitting
it to appear specially in this action solely for the purpose of protecting
its interest in the attached bank accounts and limiting plaintiff's recovery,
if any, in this action, to the property attached." The court concluded
that the issue was procedural and that the limited appearance could not
be allowed in the absence of provision therefor under the federal rules, 2
26.
27.

224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916).
285 Fed. 214 (C. C. A. 6th 1922). For detailed discussion of these two cases, see

Taintor, Foreign Judgment in Rem: Full Faith and Credit v. Res Judicata in Personat,
8 PiTT. L. REV. 223, 229 (1942).
28. 55 How. Pr. 255 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1878).
29. Id. at 258.
30. 224 Mass. 14, 15, 112 N.E. 500, 502 (1916).
31. 3 F.R.D. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
32. In view of the development of the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938),
can it be stated dogmatically that the issue is solely one of procedure? The court relies
solely upon Professor Moore, 1 MooRE's FEDEn
PRACTIC 650 (1938), for the proposition
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and its view as to the New York law is therefore only dictum. This view
was based solely upon Henderson v. Hendersonp a leading New York
case for the proposition that acts of a defendant inconsistent with a
special appearance may be equivalent to a general appearance. In the
Henderson case, plaintiff sued for divorce, alimony, and counsel fees;
the nonresident defendant attempted to make a special appearance and
at the same time actually participated in the hearing of the action on
the merits. Although the Henderson case has been cited 34 for the proposition that a limited appearance cannot be made in New York in the
divorce-alimony situation, the defendant there made no attempt to
contest only the divorce portion of the action on the merits, and to reserve,
at the same time, his objections to the in personam jurisdiction of the
court as to the demand for alimony and counsel fees. On its facts, the
Henderson case cannot be regarded as a clear-cut decision on the right
to make a limited appearance, despite general language in the opinion
which might tend to indicate that the right does not exist in the divorcealimony situation. Perhaps the absence of recent New York authority
specifically in point as to the attachment situation can be attributed
simply to a general assumption on the part of the bar that there is no
right of limited appearance in that situation.
Jurisdictional concepts cannot remain static but must continue to
develop to meet the needs of our complex modern economic and social
structure. Consideration must, therefore, be given to the policy factors
behind the idea of limited appearance. Do these factors vary from case
to case so that the right of limited appearance should be given in one
type of situation involving in rem and in personam claims and yet be
denied in other situations? In the first place, why should a defendant
desire to enter a limited appearance, which admittedly can result in litigation twice of the same issue upon the merits? Ordinarily, of course a
party prefers to litigate in his own locality. He is thereby spared the
inconvenience and expense of travel to the place of trial and he has the
that the limited type of appearance is not permissible in the federal courts. Professor
Moore argues that, despite the Salmon Fall and Cheshire National Bank cases, and Gershowitz v. Lane Cotton Mills, 21 F. Supp. 579 (N. D. Tex. 1937) (defendant's motion for
limitation of recovery to property attached granted without objection by plaintiff), the
limited appearance procedure is unsound because it permits a litigation twice on the merits
of the same claim. He does not amplify his discussion of this problem in his second edition,
merely noting that the Grant case, citing his treatise, had reached a result in accord with
his position, 2 MooR's FEDER.AL PRACTICE § 12.13 (2d ed. 1948).
33. 247 N.Y. 428, 160 N.E. 775 (1928).
34. Comment, supra note 21, at 236. Legler v. Legler, 244 App. Div. 55, 278 N.Y. Supp.
804 (4th Dep't 1935) is also cited as support for the same proposition but in the Legler

case the defendant's attorney, after entering a special appearance, argued against the merits
of the alimony order.
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limited advantage of knowledge of local conditions of trial. If his own
witnesses reside in his locality, and place of trial is elsewhere, out of the
state, he is faced with the expense of transporting them to the place of
trial or of taking depositions. He cannot subpoena his witnesses to attend
a trial in another state, and if they refuse to attend voluntarily, he must
take their depositions, an expensive and clearly less effective mode of
proof than oral testimony. Rules of evidence or of substantive law may
vary to his prejudice.- Obviously these considerations are as equally
applicable to a plaintiff as to a defendant,"0 and the relative conveniences
of the parties will vary from case to case." Similarly, the contacts of
the claims for relief with the state of suit will vary. Professor Moore
considers the attachment cases in connection with his query as to the
rule in the federal courts in the lien foreclosure-deficiency judgment
situation,38 but should the lien foreclosure-deficiency judgment situations
be treated alike? Is a defendant who has executed or assumed a mortgage on property in New York in the same position to insist upon the
right to make a limited appearance as a defendant who is subjected to
suit in New York by reason of the mere accident of owning property
subject to attachment in New York? Are two defendants whose property
has been attached to be considered in the same position, if the action
against one is based upon a cause of action which accrued within the
state of suit? So, also, if a plaintiff has acquired domicile in New York,
35. For an interesting illustration of such a situation, see Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v.
Sternberg Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94 (1939), suggestion of error overruled,
189 Miss. 73, 195 So. 322 (1940), extensively discussed by Taintor, supra note 27, at 224,
232, 235-237. In that case, in an action in rem in Louisiana, the nonresident defendant
was prevented from introduction of evidence of oral warranties by Louisiana's characterization of the parol evidence rule as procedural, rather than substantive. In a subsequent
in personam action in Mississippi, defendant was held to be bound by the Louisiana judgment because of its appearance in that action, despite the fact that the Louisiana court
under Louisiana statutes had no power to render a judgment in personam against the
defendant. See also, Edgell v. Clarke, 19 App. Div. 199, 45 N.Y. Supp. 979 (1st Dep't
1897).
36.

Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1218 (1930):

...

the

physical power criterion may sometimes cregte undue obstacles to the prosecution of
meritorious claims, and sometimes, by affording plaintiffs a wide choice of forums, present
an opportunity to vex and inconvenience the defendant out of all proportion to what is
necessary for a fair presentation of the plaintiff's own case-or to use the threat of such
vexation to coerce settlement of doubtful claims otherwise than on the basis of their
merits."
37.

ARNOLD AND JAMES, CASES ON TRIAS, JUDGmENTs AND APPEALS 399 n. 36 (1936):

.. . one cannot avoid the feeling of impatience that the Supreme Court should be so
afraid to give judicial approval to the eminently sensible and practical notion that courts
should be given very broad jurisdictional powers, and then compelled to exercise those
powers on considerations of practical convenience among the parties."
38.

Moore, supra note 32.
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so that the courts of New York have jurisdiction of an action for divorce,
does not New York have a considerably more important interest in the
litigation than it does in an attachment action, especially one based upon
a cause of action which did not accrue within the state? It cannot reasonably be argued that the limited appearance concept should be applied in
all cases, without consideration of the relative conveniences of the parties
and the contacts of a particular claim with the state of suit. But, what
is needed is a re-examination of the New York appearance cases, now
in a state of some confusion, in the light of the limited appearance
concept. An acceptable compromise might result from a blending of the
ideas of the limited appearance and of forum non conveniCns.?0 Considerations of forum non conveniens have been introduced into the criteria for
determination of jurisdiction over foreign corporations 4 0 and there does
not appear to be any sound reason for refusal to consider the factors of
convenience and contacts in determining a non-resident's right to make
a limited appearance. It does appear that this problem is one in which
each state must search its own conscience, for while there is no indication
that the Supreme Court is ready to discard the principle of territorial
jurisdiction, it is not at all certain either that it will give constitutional
sanction to the limited appearance concept. 41
39. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court will decline to exercise jurisdiction because a more convenient forum exists elsewhere for trial of the action. In the
absence of special circumstances, the New York courts will refuse to entertain jurisdiction
of foreign tort actions between nonresidents. This idea is not however applied in New York
in commercial actions between nonresidents, nor is it applicable if one of the parties is
a resident. Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E.
223 (1923); De Flammercourt v. Ascer, 167 Misc. 473, 3 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1938). See, in
general, Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CaLW. L. Rev. 380 (1947).
40. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945): "To say
that the corporation is so far 'present' there as to satisfy due process requirements, for
purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to
beg the question to be decided. For the terms 'present! or 'presence' are used merely to
synbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts vll
deem to be sufficient the demands of due process. L. Hand, J., in Hutchinson v. Chase &
Gilbert, 45 F. 2d 139, 141. Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation
with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system
of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there. An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a
trial away from its 'home' or principal place of business is relevant in this connection...."
See also Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. 2d 788 (C. C. A. 2d 1948), 61 Hnv. L.
REv. 1254 (1948).
41. Professor Taintor (supra note 27) vigorously argues that a denial of the right of
limited appearance in the attachment situation is a denial of due process. His article deals
only with that situation, but it is undoubtedly the situation in which the most sympathy
can be engendered for the nonresident defendant. He appears to distinguish York v.
Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890), upholding the Texas statute denying the right of special appear-
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PERSONAM RELIEF ADDED BY AMENDED OR

SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

Suppose that plaintiff demands no in personam relief in his original
complaint and in rem jurisdiction is properly obtained to grant all of the
relief originally demanded. The nonresident defendant appears to defend
the action on the merits, and then, plaintiff amends as of course, 42 adding
a claim for relief sounding in personam, and serves the amended complaint upon defendant's attorney.3 Or, plaintiff moves for leave 44 to
serve an amended complaint, after expiration of the period within which
an amendment may be made as of course, or for leave to serve a supplemental " complaint presenting a claim for in personam relief. Is a nonresident defendant bound by service of such an amended or supplemental
complaint upon his attorney? To what extent does and should a nonresident defendant appearing to defend a complaint as originally served
upon him subject himself to additional claims which may be asserted in
an amended or supplemental complaint? The limited appearance idea

comprehends not only in personam claims presented in the original
complaint but additional claims which may be subsequently asserted.
In Mendoza v. Mendoza,4" an action for annulment was commenced
ance, on the ground that in the attachment situation the defendant is compelled to abandon
his property if he does not desire to make a general appearance. Of course, theoretically,
plaintiff must show that he has a cause of action, whether or not the defendant appears.
On the other hand, the Restatement of Judgments, although supporting the limited appearance idea where there has been an attachment, takes the position that such a provision Is
not unconstitutional as a denial of due process.
42. N.Y. Cry. PRc. AcT § 244: "Within twenty days after a pleading, or the answer
or reply thereto is served, or at any time before the period for answering it expires, or
within twenty days after the service of a notice of a motion addressed to the pleading,
the pleading may be once amended by the party, of course, without costs and without
prejudice to the proceedings already had. .. ."
43. N.Y. RULES Civ. PRAC. ACT § 101: "If a pleading be amended, a copy thereof must be
served on the attorney for the adverse party. A failure to answer the amended pleading,
within twenty days thereafter, has the same effect as a like failure to answer the original
pleading." See also, N.Y. Civ. PpAc. AcT § 163: "Where a party has appeared a notice
or other paper required to be served in an action must be served upon his attorney ...
This section does not apply to the service of a summons or other process; or of a paper
to bring a party into contempt; or to a case where the mode of service is specially
prescribed by law."
44. The discretion of the court is to be liberally exercised in favor of allowing amendment. Harris v. Tams, 258 N. Y. 229, 179 N. E. 476 (1932).
45. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. AT § 245-a: "Upon application by a party the court may, upon
such terms as are just, permit the party to serve a supplemental pleading alleging any new
and additional cause or causes of action or counterclaims even though such additional causes
of action or counterclaims came into existence after the commencement of the action.
46. 77 N. Y. S. 2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd mem., 273 App. Div. 877, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 264
(1st Dep't 1948), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 950, 80 N.E. 2d 347 (1948).
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against a nonresident by service by publication. Defendant filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint, thereby making a general appearance under
Section 237 of the Civil Practice Act. Plaintiff then served upon defendant's attorney a complaint, amended as of course, containing a new and
independent cause of action for $20,000 alleged to have been fraudulently
obtained from her by defendant and his father. The court denied defendant's motion to strike this new claim on the ground that it possessed
no discretion as to an amendment made as of course, and that such
amendments may add new and additional causes of action. On that basis
it distinguished Alkalaj v. Alkalaj,47 an action for sums due under a separation agreement commenced by attaching defendant's bank account
within the state, in which plaintiff moved for leave to add, in a supplemental complaint, a claim for sums becoming due after commencement
of the action. The motion was served after the defendant had served a
notice of general appearance and interposed an answer, and the court,
in denying plaintiff's motion as an exercise of discretion, broadly stated:
"Parties should be encouraged to appear in actions so that judgments will
have an in personam validity. The possibility that such appearance may result
in the addition of other causes of action will tend to deter general appearances.
Furthermore a defendant placed in the position of the Instant one at the time
the attachment was obtained had no other recourse but to appear or permit
the action to go by default. Therefore the circumstances here appeal to the
discretion of the court to deny the instant application. If plaintiff can obtain
jurisdiction she can sue for the additional sums in an independent action '48
The implication in the Alkalaj opinion that defendant had no right of
limited appearance in the original attachment situations is noteworthy.
The court in the Mendoza case would undoubtedly have distinguished
on the same basis Phillips v. Phillips,9 a separation case, in which plaintiff moved for leave to serve an amended complaint adding two causes
of action in personam. In denying the motion, the court very briefly
stated:
"These actions could not have been commenced by service of process as in
the separation case unless an attachment was first obtained."' 0O
In all three of these cases-Mendoza, Alkalaj, and Phillips-the court
was faced with an attempt by the plaintiff to add a new and independent
cause requiring in personam jurisdiction, after the defendant had made a
general appearance. As to result, there can be little quarrel with the
47. 190 Misc. 326, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 678 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
48. Id. at 327, 73 N. Y. S. 2d at 679.
49. 119 N.Y.L. J. 584 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 16, 1948).

so. Ibid.
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Alkalaj or Phillips cases, but the disturbing feature of both the Mendoza
and Alkala] cases is their assumption that the problem involves the element of discretion. Now, it is of course settled that, as a matter of pleading, a complaint amended as of course may add new and additional causes
of action, and there is no discretion in the court as to whether or not
such causes will be added.5 Similarly, there is discretion in the court as
to a motion for leave to add new causes in an amended or supplemental
complaint. But, the problem here is more than simply a question of
pleading, it is a question of jurisdiction. That this is a problem of jurisdiction, rather than merely of pleading, is recognized by the American
Law Institute Restatement of Judgments:
"§ 5. Comment g. Jurisdiction as to causes of action added or substituted

by amendment. If a plaintiff brings an action against a defendant who is subjected to the jurisdiction of the court, whether by personal service upon him
within the State or by a substituted form of service while he is domiciled within
the State or by his general appearance in the action or otherwise, the jurisdiction of the court over him continues although the complaint is amended,
where the effect of the amendment is not to add or substitute a different cause
of action from that stated in the complaint.
"The result is different, however, where by amendment a different cause of
action is added to or substituted for the original cause of action, if when the
amendment is made the defendant is no longer subject to 'the jurisdiction of
the State. This is true whether or not notice of the amendment is given to the
defendant. .

.

. The fact that the court has acquired jurisdiction over the

defendant with respect to the original cause of action does not give the court
jursdiction over him as to other causes of action. . . The result is the same
also where the defendant was not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
court but entered a general appearance in the action before the complaint was
amended....
"It is immaterial whether the cause of action stated in the amended pleadings
arose before the action was brought or subsequently to the bringing of the action.
"The fact that by statute or otherwise a plaintiff is permitted to add or to
substitute new causes of action by amendment is not sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction over the defendant as to such new causes of action if at the time
of the amendment the defendant is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the
State. Such provisions are applicable only where at the time of the amendment
the State has jurisdiction over the defendant; they are procedural rather than
jurisdictional."
"Illustrations: . . .
6. By a statute of State X, a plaintiff is permitted to amend his complaint
by adding or substituting a cause of action other than that stated in the
51. Brown v. Leigh, 49 N.Y. 78 (1872). Consider, however, the statement by the court,
at 82, not amplified in subsequent cases, that "the causes of action in the amended complaint must, like those in the original, be warranted by the summons."
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complaint. A brings an action in State X against B, who is domiciled in State Y,
claiming damages for breach of a contract. B is not served with process in
State X, but enters a general appearance in the action by C, his attorney.
Thereafter A amends his complaint by adding a claim against B for assault
and battery. B moves to strike out the amendment to the complaint on the
ground that as to the claim stated2 therein the court has no jurisdiction over
him. The motion will be granted.115

To what extent is this position, although contrary to that earlier taken
by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,' supported by the authorities?
In Ex parte Indiana TransportationCo.,) 4 after an appearance by defendant in a libel in personam for causing the death of a person through
capsizing of a steamer, the court granted leave to intervene to 373 other
libellants each alleging a distinct cause of action for death due to the
same accident. At that time the defendant was not subject to process
within the federal district, but it was contended that the court had jurisdiction over it in respect of the additional libellants by reason of the
defendant's earlier appearance in the action. The court repudiated this
contention, stating:
"... appearance in answer to a citation does not bring a defendant under the
general physical power of the -court. He is not supposed even by fiction to be
in prison. Conventional effect is given to a decree after an appearance because
when power once has been manifested it is to the advantage of all not to insist
upon its being maintained to the end. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S.
346, 353. That, however, is the limit of the court's authority. Not having any
power in fact over the defendant unless it can seize him again, it cannot introduce new claims of new claimants into an existing suit simply because the
52. R STAT_NmqT, JvxmwENsm, § 5, Comment g (1942), also states the well-established
rule that "the jurisdiction of the court over him continues although the complaint is
amended, where the effect of the amendment is not to add or substitute a different cause
of action from that stated in the complaint." This principle of continuing jurisdiction is
upheld in Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913). In application of this principle, in Ohlquist v. Nordstrom, 143 Misc. 502, 257 N.Y. Supp. 711 (Sup. Ct. 1932), a'd
mem., 238 App. Div. 766, 261 N.Y. Supp. 1039 (4th Dep't 1933), aff'd mem., 262 N.Y.
696, 188 N.E. 125 (1933), service of notice of motion under Section 211a of the Cihil
Practice Act for contribution from a codefendant on New York attorneys who had appeared
for the codefendant in the original action was upheld, although the codefendant had
ceased to be a resident of the state. But cf. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, 241
U.S. 518 (1916).
53. RESTATEamT, Co.Nrcr oP LAWS § 82 (1934), Comment d. "Subsequent amendments
to complaint after appearance. When by the law of the state in which the action is brought,
an appearance is such as to subject him to the jurisdiction of the court generally, jurisdiction attaches not only with respect to claims stated in the original complaint but also
to the claims by the same plaintiff stated in amendments to the complaint if the law of
the state where the action is brought so provides at the time of the appearance."
54. 244 U.S. 456 (1916).
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defendant has appeared in that suit. The new claimants are strangers and
their action by service just as if no one had sued the defendant
must begin
55
before."
True it is that this case involved additional plaintiffs, possessing separate
causes of action against the defendant, but is not a distinction on that
basis from the situation in the Mendoza case rather tenuous? It is well
to remember in this connection that Section 237 of the Civil Practice Act
merely provides that "a voluntary general appearance of the defendant
is equivalent to personal service of the summons upon him."
In Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Bank of Plymouth,0
plaintiff originally sought an in rem judgment setting aside a conveyance
of a specific tract of land alleged to be made in fraud of creditors. After
appearance by the defendant, plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended
complaint adding a new cause of action for an in personam judgment as
to proceeds received by defendant from sale of another tract alleged to
have been fraudulently conveyed. Stating that "the precise question is
one of first impression in this state, and the industry and research of
counsel have failed to bring to our attention any case in which the same
has been passed upon by the court of any other jurisdiction, 5 1 the court
denied plaintiff's motion on the ground that it "would challenge the good
faith of the court" to allow the amendment. The court pointed out that
no in personan relief was demanded in the original complaint, that the
amended complaint sought to set up an entirely new cause of action as
to a different tract of land, and that defendant had not been personally
served within the state with the amended complaint.
Would the court in the Mendoza case have reached a different result
if the amended complaint had substituted an entirely new cause of action,
rather than merely adding a new cause of action? In Hay v. Tuttle,"8
plaintiff instituted an action for conversion of certain stock, apparently
located in Massachusetts, by attachment of the defendant's property.
The defendant appeared, and, at the trial, plaintiff failed to prove a
demand for return of the stock alleged to have been converted, as re55.

Id. at 457.

See also, Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938), wherein the court, In

sustaining service of counterclaim on attorney of nonresident plaintiff under California
procedure, pointed out (at 67) that "the plaintiff having, by his voluntary act in demanding
justice from the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, there Is
nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as being there for all purposes for which
justice to the defendant requires his presence. It is the price which the state may exact
as the condition of opening its courts to the plantiff." May the state exact the same price
as a condition of opening its courts to a defendant?
56. 213 Iowa 1058, 237 N.W. 234 (1931), 25 IowA L. REV. 329 (1940).
57. Id. at 1060, 237 N. W. at 235.
58.

67 Minn. 56, 69 N. W. 696 (1896).
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quired under Minnesota law. Plaintiff then attempted to amend his complaint so as to set aside the transfer of the stock and to recover it from
the defendant. Denying plaintiff the right to so amend, the court made
the point that:
"... there was an important question of comity involved. The defendant
being a nonresident, no jurisdiction of his person could be obtained, unless he
voluntarily came within the state, or voluntarily appeared in an action. By
framing his complaint ostensibly as one for conversion, and attaching defendant's property, as if the action was one for the recovery of money, the plaintiff
compelled the defendant to appear, and submit to the jurisdiction of the court,
for the purpose of protecting his property against the attachment.'" 9
Similarly, in Maya Corporationv. Smith00 plaintiff originally instituted
an action to foreclose a lien upon certain stock, based upon in rem
jurisdiction. Plaintiff sought to amend its complaint to state a cause of
action for recission of the contract of sale of the stock and to recover
an in personam judgment for the further consideration paid by plaintiff
in cash for the property acquired by plaintiff under the contract. The
court allowed defendants to withdraw their appearances, pointing out
that the cause of action asserted in the amended complaint would not
have been within the in rem jurisdiction of the court.
It does appear that the position of the Restatement of Judgments,
despite the Mendoza case, is supported by competent and well-reasoned
authority, which is based upon principles of "fair play and substantial
justice" to the nonresident defendant, principles which are embodied in
the constitutional requirements of due process.6
One recent New York decision, Nicholas & Co. v. Societe Anonyme,does support the Restatement of Judgments position, even though the
actual result in the case would be sanctioned by the Mendoza case.
Plaintiff's original complaint alleged a cause of action for lost profits in
the sum of $8,049.00 against the defendant, a French corporation. The
loss was alleged to have been suffered as a result of defendant's failure
to deliver merchandise purchased by plaintiff for the purpose of resale.
After attachment of defendant's property in New York and personal
service in France, defendant's attorney filed an appearance and answer.
59.
60.

Id. at 59, 69 N. W. at 697.
32 F.2d 350 (D. Del. 1929).

61. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945): 11... due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if be
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice?"
62. 189 MHisc. 863, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 155 (Sup. Ct. 1947), affd inem., 272 App. Div. 1002,
74 N.Y. S.2d 403 (lst Dep't 1947).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

Plaintiff then amended as of course, reiterating the allegations of the
original complaint but adding allegations which set out a claim for total
damages in the sum of $50,000 for wrongful termination of an alleged
exclusive agency agreement. The purchases upon which the original
complaint was based arose out of this agency agreement. Defendant
moved for an order permitting its attorneys to withdraw their general
appearance and vacating the warrant of attachment on the ground that
plaintiff had abandoned its cause of action on which the attachment
was procured" and had substituted a different cause of action, thereby
discharging the attachment and entitling defendant to be relieved of its
appearance. In denying the defendant's motion, the court held that
whether defendant's contention was sound depended on the meaning of

"a different cause of action. A different form of action, involving different legal consequences from the same facts, would give rise to no
'such relief, provided of course that this form was of the description in
which attachment is a permissible remedy."'
Is the court sound in its conclusion that the amended complaint set
out no different cause of action? Such conclusion is in line with the
Restatement of Judgments position, for the Restatement utilizes in this
connection the same definitions it gives to the term "cause of action"
for purposes of res judicata. 4 So, under the Restatement, "if a breach
of contract constitutes a repudiation of the contract a judgment in an
action for breach of contract bars a subsequent action for all elements
of damages arising from the contract."6' Now, applying these or any
other tests, the new claims set up in the Mendoza, Alkalaj and Phillips
cases constituted new causes of action. But only one cause of action
would appear to be involved, under the Restatement tests, in such situations as divorce-alimony, lien foreclosure-deficiency judgment, and
specific performance-damages. 6
63. Ibid. (Italics supplied).
64. §§ 61-67.
65. Comment h, § 62. See, in this connection, Pakas v. Holingshead, 184 N.Y. 211
(1906) ; Koppel v. St. Regis Paper Co., 47 N. Y. S. 2d 443 (City Ct. N.Y. 1C44), rev'd per
curian, 56 N.Y. S. 2d 790 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1945).
66. In Johnston v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 226 Iowa 496, 284 N.W. 393 (1939),
the complaint, in an action originally for specific performance of a contract for a loan
on realty, was amended to set out damages occurring after the institution of suit and to
change the prayer for relief from specific performance to one for money damages. It was
held that the amendment did not constitute a new "cause of action" and that the defendants, who had previously made a general appearance, were bound. On that basis, that
no new cause was being asserted by the amendment, the court distinguished the Fidelity
& Casualty Co. case, supra note 56. The court did not particularly stress the fact that in
personam jurisdiction was required as to the claim originally asserted in the Johnston case.
It apparently would have reached the same result as to an action originally for the
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JURISDICTION IN NEW YORK

Is the attachment situation once again worthy of special treatment?
Note that in the Nicholas & Co. case the court expressed the opinion
that even though the cause of action be considered the same, jurisdiction
could not be sustained if attachment would not be a permissible remedy
under the amended complaint." To that extent the opinion goes beyond
the Restatement of Judgments position. But, it nevertheless represents
a sensible viewpoint.
Obviously these problems would not arise if the nonresident defendant
were allowed to enter a limited appearance to the in rem action as originally instituted. The argument is stronger for the right of limited appearance in this situation than where the demand for in personam relief is
contained in the original complaint. Whereas the defendant is put on
notice of the in personam claim if it is asserted in the original complaint,
he is groping in the dark as to subsequently added claims. Not only are
the same considerations of policy applicable here as were previously
discussed in connection with in personam claims contained in the original
complaint, but, as has been pointed out, stronger constitutional sanctions
are also present. Even if a defendant should not be allowed to make a
limited appearance as to in personam claims asserted in an original complaint, such right should be allowed as to in personam claims subsequently
asserted. 8
conveyance of land within the state. See Dunlop v. First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank,
222 Iowa 887, 270 N.W. 362 (1936), semble.
67. In Lane & Bailey v. Beam, 19 Barb. 51 (N.Y. 1854), defendant having appeared
after attachment, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint,
from an action on contract, to an action in tort for conversion, on the ground that attachment was not a permissible remedy as to the claim in tort (at 53): "The courts are disposed . . . to allow any amendment that justice may require. Does justice call for this
amendment? The plaintiff has played his game with an object in view, and succeeded in
that, and he should not be allowed now to seek another advantage inconsistent with his
first successful scheme." Of course, there should be little question that the attachment
itself can be vacated where an entirely different cause of action is set up. Wade v. Gates
Rubber Co., 205 App. Div. 17, 199 N.Y. Supp. 16 (Ist Dep't 1923).
68. The Restatement of Judgments position as to jurisdiction must, however, be distinguished from the limited appearance idea, insofar as operation of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is concerned. Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of facts litigated in one
action, and necessary to a determination, in a subsequent action between the same parties
on a different cause of action. Schuylkiil Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250
N. Y. 304, 165.N. E. 456 (1929); Karameros v. Luther, 279 N. Y. 87, 17 N. E. 2d 779
(1938); RFSTATF-MENT, JuDmmNTS § 68 (1942); Scott, Collateral Estoppel By Judgment,
56 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1942). Under the Restatement, this doctrine would be applicable in
a subsequent suit on a different cause of action, even though the court lacked jurisdiction as
to that cause, if the defendant appeared in the first action. RESTATEmENT, JuDGM .s
§§ 73 (Comment c), 74 (Comment c), 75 (Comment c) (1942). The limited appearance
concept, strictly applied, would not permit operation of collateral estoppel, or, for that matter, res judicata, if the second suit be for a personal judgment on the same cause. The Restatement fully adopts the limited appearance idea only in the attachment situation.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

CONCLUSION

"I have just mailed to you a memorandum on the problems of appearance in
New York which we discussed in connection with X's case," telephones Brown
to Smith. I think you will see from my memorandum that I cannot recommend,
in view of the present state of the decisions, that we appear to contest this
divorce on the merits unless X is prepared to have an in personam judgment
entered against him for alimony and counsel fees."
"What about the claim of X's wife for $20,000?" asks Smith.
"There is a big risk involved there also, as you will see," says Brown. "On
the basis of the Mendoza case, X is likely to be subjected to the in personam
jurisdiction of the court as to that claim by an appearance to contest the divorce
action. If X's wife were to amend and add that claim, I think we might have
to carry the case up to the Court of Appeals and possibly even to the United
States Supreme Court."
"Well," replies Smith. "I think we'd better just stay out of this New York
divorce action. I'm actually not so perturbed about X's wife getting alimony
and counsel fees if she can prove that she is entitled to a divorce, but I'm
certainly not interested in litigating that $20,000 claim in New York. We'll
just forget about the matter and let her get her divorce. By our doing that,
she certainly can't get anything else."
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